DDASaccident382 by Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident
James Madison University
JMU Scholarly Commons
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
7-27-2002
DDASaccident382
Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident Database
AID
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd
Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
Public Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons
This Other is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please
contact dc_admin@jmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Database, Humanitarian Demining Accident and Incident, "DDASaccident382" (2002). Global CWD Repository. 582.
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/582
DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 382 
Accident time: Not recorded Accident Date: 27/07/2002 
Where it occurred: MF 503 Country: Lebanon 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 26/08/2002 
ID original source: BOI:No008/2002 Name of source: MACC SL 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: No.4 Israel AP blast / 
frag 
Ground condition: dry/dusty 
rocks/stones 
Date record created: 22/02/2004 Date  last modified: 23/03/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: MF 503 Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
 
Accident report 
A summarised MACC BOI report was made available in 2003. It is reproduced below, edited 
for anonymity. The acronym MDD stands for Mine Detecting Dogs. 
 
Introduction 
1.  [1st commercial demining group] has been using mechanical preparation, 
manual clearance and MDD verification at minefield 503 since they were issued Task Dossier 
OES 3# 010 on the 22 June 2002. While working on minefield 503 several more minefields 
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have also been discovered during the verification of the outer minefield parameters. The MTI 
325 flailed one lane in a previously uncleared area when a detonation occurred. The MTI 325 
reversed out of the area and manual demining assets were tasked to clear this new 
discovered minefield. This new discovered minefield was designated M/F 503/A.  
2.  On the day of the accident a [1st commercial demining group] Deminer was conducting 
manual clearance in a clearance lane next to a row of No.4 mines. While using the demining 
trowel to scratch small pieces of gravel away from one No.4 mine, it detonated. The Deminer 
then rolled over to the right from the blast, while rolling he actually rolled over an uncleared 
area down into a cleared area.  
3.  [1st commercial demining group] M7 Team Leader was standing 25m away when he 
heard the blast and went to the place of the accident to check on the cause. The Team 
Leader then called for medical assistance and at the same time [1st commercial demining 
group] M5 Team Leader brought in a stretcher. The casualty was then placed on a stretcher 
and carried to safe area where the victim was stabilized by the Medic. A Deminer was 
ordered to close off the accident working lane ensuring that all equipment was untouched. 
4.  Once the Deminer was stabilized, he was placed into the ambulance and taken to Bint 
Jubayl Hospital. Due to the extent of his injuries, the Deminer was transferred to Hammoud 
Hospital Sidon in order to receive the correct specialist treatment. 
 
Medical details 
5.  The casualty suffered compound fracture to his right index finger, deep lacerations to his 
upper lip and superficial multiple abrasions to his upper right arm.  
 
Conclusions 
6. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of Inquiry 
concludes the following: 
• The Deminer was following National TSGs and [1st commercial demining group]’s 
SOPs concerning manual demining drills. 
• The Deminer was wearing his PPE in accordance to National TSGs and [1st 
commercial demining group]’s SOPs, which reduced  his injuries. 
• The Deminer was thrown out of his safe lane by the blast wave. Before he stopped 
rolling, he rolled through an uncleared area before he stopped inside a safe area. 
• The visor shattered after being impacted with rock fragments at extremely high 
velocities following the detonation of the high explosive. 
• The visor did not maintain its integrity following the uncontrolled detonation of an 
Israeli No.4 AP mine. 
• The protective jacket was pierced by debris but still maintained its integrity. [The 
“jacket” was in fact a frontal apron.] 
• The previous one time flailing of the area may have had a direct effect on the 
sensitivity state of the mine fuze. (Para 26 to this report refers). 
• The site stabilization of causality was performed in a safe area. 
• No IMAS currently covers Mechanical Mine Clearance techniques.  
• Internal and external communications with [1st commercial demining group] and 
MACC SL functioned very well. 
• Medical attention and evacuation was conducted in a safe and effective manner. 
• The BOI don’t agree with the [1st commercial demining group] report concerning the 
tools used when the accident occurred. The reason is that the BOI had the 
opportunity to question the Deminer after the accident, which [1st commercial 
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demining group] did not have due to time stress while delivering their report within 36 
hours after the accident.  
 
Recommendations 
7. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of Inquiry 
recommends the following: 
• An amendment is necessary to the [1st commercial demining group]’s SOPs detailing 
procedures for manual clearance and demolitions in areas that are on a slope. 
Referring to the Deminer rolling into an uncleared area. Procedures should be 
adapted to make sure that the area below the deminer is cleared 
• Revise the procedures of “actions on” when MTI 325 flail system is used in the area 
reduction role and detonates the first “assumed” mine. 
• The future issue IMAS 9.50 “Guide to use of Mechanical Mine Clearance Equipment” 
will hopefully give direction regarding the use of mechanical assets. 
• The conclusions detailed in this report be disseminated amongst all [1st commercial 
demining group] Operational Field Staff. 
• A period of refresher / confidence training is conducted with [1st commercial demining 
group] Operational Field Staff, to include the following: Manual excavation 
Techniques. 
 
Signed: QA MDD Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 499 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available 
(insured HMT) 
Time to hospital: Not recorded 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 






No medical report was made available. 
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Analysis 
The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as “Unavoidable” because the 
Victim appears to have been working as directed and in accordance with approved working 
methods when the detonation occurred.  
The investigation of this accident is listed as “inadequate” because it does not include detailed 
statements or the full evidence on which the conclusions are based. This may be because it is 
a “summary”.  No time of accident or Medevac timings were recorded.  
The visor shattering is the second time this happened with this group in Lebanon and raises 
questions about the age and condition of the visor. Polycarbonate is hardened by prolonged 
exposure to UV and becomes much more likely to shatter.  
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